The unintended consequences of combining equity measures with performance-based financing in Burkina Faso by Turcotte-Tremblay, Anne-Marie et al.
RESEARCH Open Access
The unintended consequences of
combining equity measures with
performance-based financing in
Burkina Faso
Anne-Marie Turcotte-Tremblay1,2* , Manuela De Allegri3, Idriss Ali Gali-Gali4,5 and Valéry Ridde1,6
Abstract
Background: User fees and poor quality of care contribute to low use of healthcare services in Burkina Faso. The
government implemented an innovative intervention that combines equity measures with performance-based
financing (PBF). These health equity measures included a community-based selection of indigents to receive
user fee exemptions and paying healthcare centres higher purchase prices for services provided to indigents.
Research suggests complex interventions can trigger changes not targeted by program planners. To date,
however, there is a knowledge gap regarding the unintended consequences that can emerge from combining PBF
with health equity measures. Our objective is to document unintended consequences of the equity measures in this
complex intervention.
Methods: We developed a conceptual framework using the diffusion of innovations theory. For the design, we
conducted a multiple case study. The cases were four healthcare facilities in one district. We collected data
through 93 semi-structured interviews, informal discussions, observation, as well as intervention documents.
We conducted thematic analysis using a hybrid deductive-inductive approach. We also used secondary data
to describe the monthly evolution of services provided to indigent and non-indigent patients before and after indigent
cards were distributed. Time series graphs were used to validate some results.
Results: Local actors, including members of indigent selection committees and healthcare workers, re-invented
elements of the PBF equity measures over which they had control to increase their relative advantage or to
adapt to implementation challenges and context. Some individuals who did not meet the local conceptualization of
indigents were selected to the detriment of others who did. Healthcare providers believed that distributing free
medications led to financial difficulties and drug shortages, especially given the low purchase prices and long
payment delays. Healthcare workers adopted measures to limit free services delivered to indigents, which led
to conflicts between indigents and providers. Ultimately, selected indigents received uncertain and unequal coverage.
Conclusions: The severity of unintended consequences undermined the effectiveness and equity of the intervention.
If the intervention is prolonged and expanded, decision-makers and implementers will have to address these
unintended consequences to reduce inequities in accessing care.
Keywords: Performance-based financing, User fee exemption, Universal health coverage, Indigents, Unintended
consequences, Burkina Faso, Multiple-case study
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Background
Achieving health equity remains a challenge in many
low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). User fees
significantly limit access to services, especially for the
poor, while quality of care is often considered to be in-
sufficient. In the pursuit of universal health coverage
(UHC), governments are adopting a range of interven-
tions to provide access to high-quality health services
without exposing patients to financial hardship [1, 2].
Some approaches are primarily directed at service pro-
viders (supply side) to improve the quality of healthcare
services, while others focus on beneficiaries (demand
side) to reduce financial obstacles that limit access to
care. Interventions that combine measures to improve
equity in service use, quality of care, and financial pro-
tection may be promising, as they provide a more com-
prehensive response to health needs [1, 2].
In this vein, performance-based financing (PBF) is in-
creasingly being adopted to improve the quantity and
quality of healthcare services. However, few attempts
have been made to combine PBF with equity measures
that target vulnerable groups, in spite of emerging evi-
dence suggesting PBF is not inherently pro-poor [3, 4].
In Cameroon, for example, a PBF program with specific
measures to target the poorest found under-coverage
was a concern. Indigents who attended the facility con-
stituted only a tiny proportion of the population (max-
imum 0.7%) [5]. According to Renmans and colleagues
[6], consensus exists on the fact that “PBF is not adapted
to tackle social determinants or health inequities.” More
broadly, it is possible that any purchasing mechanism,
by being primarily focused on the supply side, has diffi-
culty producing equity changes. Global health actors are
consequently calling for strategic purchasing reforms
such as PBF to be reoriented by linking them with add-
itional measures that can promote equity and achieve
universal health coverage by 2030 [7].
Innovating in this field, the government of Burkina
Faso received financial and technical support from the
World Bank to test PBF with different equity measures
specifically targeting indigents [8]. Health equity mea-
sures included: a) a community-based selection of indi-
gents, b) user fee exemption measures for indigents at
point of service, and c) higher purchase prices to health-
care centres for some services delivered to indigents
than for those provided to non-indigents. To select indi-
gents, a local consultancy firm was contracted to adapt
and reproduce the process described by Ridde, whereby
village committees proposed lists of indigents that were
then validated by the health centres’ management com-
mittees [9]. This method was chosen by the Ministry of
Health based on evidence of its effectiveness [9, 10].
Committees of community representatives relied on
their knowledge of the population and living conditions
to select indigents based on locally accepted definitions:
individuals who are extremely disadvantaged socially and
economically, unable to look after themselves, and de-
void of internal or external resources [9]. The definitions
of indigence could be heterogeneous across communities
because they were intended to be adapted to local real-
ities. According to intervention reports, 15–20% of the
population in the selected healthcare centres’ catchment
areas were supposed to receive indigent cards to access
free healthcare services and medication [11, 12].
For the PBF component of this intervention, health-
care centres were paid a unit purchase price for each
targeted service delivered (e.g. curative consultation for
adults). Healthcare centres that met quality-related
performance targets following verifications were also
eligible to receive bonus payments. Quality scores of
over 50% were used to inflate PBF payments. PBF
payments were used to fund expenditures, increase
bank reserves, and pay bonuses to employees of the
healthcare centres [13].
The intervention described above is complex, given
the number of interacting components, the number of
groups and organizational levels targeted, and the num-
ber outcomes [14, 15]. Many global health actors are
concerned that implementing such a complex interven-
tion could produce unintended consequences that are
outside the targeted objectives of the intervention [16–18].
These unintended consequences are defined as changes for
which there is no purposeful action or causation and that
occur in a social system as a result of adopting,
adapting, or rejecting an innovation such as PBF [19].
These changes can be desirable or undesirable, depending
on the stakeholders’ perspectives. They can affect various
actors, such as service users, providers, donors, commu-
nity members, and government representatives.
To our knowledge, the intervention implemented in
Burkina Faso presents a unique opportunity to develop
scientific knowledge because no study has been con-
ducted to date on the unintended consequences of com-
bining PBF with equity measures for indigents in Africa.
Although program planners believe these approaches
may have a synergistic potential, the combination may
not work out as planned. Interaction between the differ-
ent rationales, goals, and operating procedures may pro-
duce unintended consequences. Thus, our objective is to
document the unintended consequences of equity mea-
sures integrated into the complex PBF intervention in
Burkina Faso.
Methods
Theoretical framework
This study was based on Rogers’ diffusion of innovations
theory [19]; our aim was to focus on the intervention’s
adoption and adaptation from a broad perspective, in
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order to capture unintended consequences. While the
theory provides an original approach to the study of PBF
in a low-income setting, it has also been used in the past
to analyze the consequences of health innovations
[20–22]. According to the theory, combining PBF
with health equity measures constitutes an innovation
because both practices are perceived as new by
adopters. The theory stipulates that diffusion of innova-
tions usually widens the socioeconomic gap. However,
when special efforts are made by a diffusion agency, it is
possible to narrow or at least not to widen it.
To understand an innovation’s diffusion process and
consequences, we can examine four main dimensions: 1)
the characteristics of the members of the social system
(e.g. their knowledge and beliefs about the intervention,
attitude towards change); 2) the nature of the social
system (e.g. norms, culture, characteristics of the
organization); 3) the nature of the innovation (e.g. rela-
tive advantage, compatibility, triability, complexity); and
4) the use of the innovation (e.g. its re-invention) [19].
These dimensions can interact to influence the emer-
gence of various types of consequences. Rogers classified
consequences as: 1) desirable or undesirable, 2) direct or
indirect, and 3) anticipated or unanticipated. To
operationalize these concepts, we considered desirable
consequences to be those that are functional (positive)
for the social system and undesirable consequences to
be those that are dysfunctional (negative). A conse-
quence could potentially be both desirable and undesir-
able, depending on the point of reference [21]. We
considered consequences as anticipated if they were ex-
plicitly or implicitly addressed in the implementation
guides. In accordance with Ash et al.’s [21] approach, we
considered direct consequences to be related to pro-
cesses and indirect consequences, to outcomes. Like
Bloomrosen et al. [20], we considered that intended con-
sequences tend to be those that are simultaneously
desirable and anticipated. In contrast, unintended conse-
quences tend to be those that are undesirable and/or un-
anticipated. Our rationale for these assumptions is that
program planners generally intend to make changes
they consider desirable and that they can anticipate.
We also assume program planners do not purpose-
fully target changes they consider undesirable or have
not anticipated. We have shown the applicability of
this typology elsewhere [23]. Figure 1 illustrates our
conceptual model [23].
Study setting
Burkina Faso is a low-income country where health
needs are a major concern. The maternal mortality ratio
is 371/100,000 live births [24]. The under-5 mortality
rate is 89/100,000 live births [25]. In the country’s
National Health Development Plan for 2011–2020 [26],
priority issues include: 1) poor performance of the health
system, especially in terms of governance and service de-
livery; 2) lack of human resources; 3) inadequate quality
and supply of health products such as medication and
vaccines; 4) insufficient coverage and maintenance of in-
frastructure, equipment, and logistics; 5) poor health in-
formation systems management; and 6) inadequate
funding for health and poor management of resources.
To address these issues, the government of Burkina
Faso conducted a pre-pilot PBF test in 2011 in three dis-
tricts [27]. In 2014, this intervention was modified to in-
clude the health equity measures described in the
introduction. It was also expanded to an additional 12
districts. To conduct an impact evaluation, funded by
the World Bank, four intervention modalities were im-
plemented across 15 districts [8]: 1) PBF1: healthcare
centres were paid fixed unit prices for activity indicators
achieved; 2) PBF2: PBF1 coupled with a community-based
selection of indigents to be exempted from user fees at
point of service; services provided to indigents were pur-
chased at a higher unit price than those provided to
non-indigents to compensate healthcare centres for finan-
cial loss due to unpaid user fees; 3) PBF3: PBF2 with higher
unit prices for services provided to indigents, to motivate
healthcare workers to treat indigents and to better compen-
sate healthcare centres for financial loss (see Additional file
1); and 4) PBF4: PBF1 linked with a community-based
health insurance program and a community-based selec-
tion process for indigents. In this article, for reasons of
feasibility, we focus on the PBF1 and PBF3 intervention
modalities (see details in the section Sampling of cases).
The present study took place in a district of Burkina
Faso where achieving equitable use of healthcare services
remains a challenge. The district population was esti-
mated at 135,740 in 2016, with more than 50% living in
poverty [28]. Of the 19 primary healthcare centres in
this district, five were allocated to PBF1, seven to PBF2,
and seven to PBF3. Although PBF started in January
2014, cards to identify the selected indigents were only
available for distribution in November 2015. Healthcare
workers, however, were encouraged to begin applying
user fee exemptions for indigents before then. Imple-
mentation guides describe the planned intervention
model and the different actors supposed to be in-
volved in the selection process [13, 29].
Research strategy
This research was nested within a larger longitudinal
process evaluation of the intervention [8]. For the de-
sign, we conducted a contrasted multiple case study with
several embedded levels of analyses [30]. The cases were
four primary healthcare centres, called Centres de santé
et de promotion sociale (CSPS – centres for health and
social promotion).
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Sampling of cases (facilities)
Case selection was done shortly after the intervention
launch and followed a multistage screening procedure
[30, 31]. First, we identified a district that represented
the normal healthcare system context and was located in
a relatively safe area for researchers. Within this district,
we assessed the CSPSs’ levels of performance on key
activity indicators for maternal and child health. We
ranked the CSPSs into quintiles to select centres with
contrasting levels of performance. We then asked key in-
formants (i.e., members of the district management
teams) in each district to help us select facilities that
were representative of their performance category
and that offered opportunities for significant insight
[30, 32, 33]. This dialogue with local informants
helped us avoid selecting cases that were outliers or
unrepresentative. For this analysis specifically, we de-
cided to focus on facilities in the first and third
intervention arms only. We selected the first inter-
vention arm (PBF1) because it represents a common
PBF model that is being widely implemented in
low-income countries, thus increasing the pertinence
of the results. We selected the third intervention
arm (PBF3) because it is an innovative PBF model
with health equity measures. The final set of cases
consisted of two high- and low-performing PBF3 facilities
and two high- and low-performing PBF1 facilities. The
data collected in the PBF3 facilities were primarily used to
understand the implementation and various changes re-
lated to the equity measures integrated within the PBF
intervention, while the data collected in the PBF1 facilities
were primarily used for triangulation purposes and to
better understand the overall context, while avoiding
over-attributing relevance to the equity measures. We did
not include PBF2 facilities, as the targeting intervention
was comparable and only unit prices differed. We also ex-
cluded PBF4 facilities because the intervention model
combining insurance with PBF is radically different and
rarely used in other countries, thereby limiting the utility
of results. Table 1 describes each facility included.
Data collection method
We collected qualitative data during two sequential
phases, with the first informing the methods used for
the second. For the first phase, the first author con-
ducted 3 months of fieldwork between January and April
2016. The researcher’s immersion in the milieu provided
a better understanding of the context and helped create
a relationship of trust with stakeholders. We visited each
healthcare facility for a two-week period to conduct
semi-structured interviews, informal discussions, and
non-participant observation. Participants included a
wide range of stakeholders, such as indigents,
non-indigents, members of indigent selection commit-
tees, representatives from the Comité de gestion (COGES –
healthcare facility management committee), community-
based health workers (CHWs), healthcare workers, and
patients. Participants were purposefully selected based on
their ability to provide relevant information and their
accessibility. Then, following the snowball approach,
some key informants referred us to other potential
participants who could shed light on the intervention.
Fig. 1 Conceptual model
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Using these approaches, we followed the diversifica-
tion principle to select participants with a variety of
intrinsic characteristics, such as different indigent sta-
tuses, occupations, and genders [33]. For the inter-
views, we constructed guides that drew on previous
questionnaires used for research on the diffusion of
innovations [34, 35]. We systematically recorded field
notes on observations and informal discussions in re-
search diaries. Observation sites included healthcare
facilities, villages, and other social settings (both pub-
lic and private). The first author also participated in a
six-day annual PBF review meeting at the national
level to triangulate data regarding unintended conse-
quences, better understand the different contexts, and
assess the potential transferability of results to other
facilities in intervention districts.
For the second phase, the third author conducted
20 days of fieldwork in May 2016 to deepen our assess-
ment of the relations between community verifications
and equity measures for indigents. He conducted
semi-structured interviews, informal discussions, and
non-participant observation in each of the four facilities.
To provide complementary data, he conducted an add-
itional interview in December 2016 with a key stake-
holder involved in indigent selection. The same
procedure was used to select participants as described
above. He recorded field notes in research diaries.
In total, we conducted 93 semi-structured interviews
and recorded 241 observation sessions in research diar-
ies. Applying the principle of saturation, we stopped col-
lecting data when interviews and observations no longer
provided information that was sufficiently different to
justify continuing. Research team members produced
verbatim transcriptions of interview recordings. Table 2
provides a breakdown of the qualitative data collected
and analyzed. It should also be noted that the last author
has in-depth understanding of the context, having par-
ticipated in workshops to define the intervention process
for the equity measures and taken part in follow-up
meetings on this topic.
We also used secondary data on healthcare services
delivery that are publicly available on the Ministry of
Health’s PBF portal (www.fbrburkina.org). These longi-
tudinal data are collected monthly in each healthcare
Table 1 Description of four cases
Descriptors Facility 1 Facility 2 Facility 3 Facility 4
Intervention arm PBF3 PBF3 PBF1 PBF1
Initial performance Low High Low High
Type of facility CSPS, public, not-for-profit CSPS, public, not-for-profit CSPS, public, not-for-profit CSPS, public, not-for-profit
Healthcare workers 1 head nurse 1 head nurse 1 head nurse 1 head nurse
2 itinerant health workers*
(IHW)
1 IHW 1 nurse 1 IHW
1 auxiliary midwife 2 IHWs 1 auxiliary midwife
1 auxiliary midwife 1 midwife 4 trainees (temporary)
1 IHW volunteer 1 auxiliary midwife
3 trainees (temporary)
Support staff 1 drug depot manager 1 drug depot manager 1 drug depot manager 1 drug depot manager
1 guard 1 guard 1 guard 1 guard
1 janitor 1 janitor 1 janitor 2 janitors
Number of villages in
catchment area
5 8 22 6
Population in catchment
area
~ 8000 ~ 3600 ~ 11,000 ~ 3700
Easy access to paved road No No Yes Yes
Ethnic majority Dagara Lobi Lobi Birifor, Djan
Number of indigents
selected (coverage rate)
829 (10.4%) 566 (15.7%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Economic activities Agriculture Agriculture Agriculture Agriculture
Livestock farming Livestock farming Livestock farming Livestock farming
Production of local alcohol Production of local alcohol Production of local alcohol Production of local alcohol
Distinctive features Gardening during dry period High migration rate High migration rate
*Itinerant health workers are employees in charge of promoting health, hygiene, and vaccination, notably through household visits and community gatherings. In practice,
they also deliver healthcare services due to the shortage of healthcare workers
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centre for PBF verifications. Healthcare workers re-
port the quantity of healthcare services delivered to
indigent and non-indigent patients, based on the
medical registers. Then PBF officers verify the re-
ported data by manually recounting the quantity of
services. They enter the data into an electronic plat-
form. We used the data collected between October
2015 and September 2016, that is, before and after
fee-exemption cards were distributed to indigents
starting in November 2015. The main sample for the
quantitative component consisted of the two facil-
ities with equity measures (PBF3) included in the
qualitative phase. To assess the transferability of the
findings across the study district, however, we exam-
ined all seven facilities within the district that were
assigned to the same intervention arm as the two se-
lected for inclusion in the qualitative component
(PBF3) and for which data were available. To assess
the transferability of findings more widely, we also
examined all 196 facilities in the intervention dis-
tricts that belonged to intervention arms with similar
measures for indigents (PBF2 and PBF3) and for
which data were available.
Data analyses
The primary unit of analysis was the healthcare facilities
and their catchment areas. We combined deductive and
inductive thematic analysis [36, 37]. We began by devel-
oping a template of themes based on our theoretical
framework. Then we carefully read the transcripts and
field notes to assign the raw data to the predefined
themes. At the same time, we derived new themes that
were not included in the initial template but that
emerged from the data and were judged relevant to our
research topic. In some cases, we narrowed down and
provided more focus to the initially defined themes to
enhance their applicability to the data. We used QDA
Miner 4 to code and retrieve text segments.
We also used descriptive statistics to examine how the
quantity of services provided to indigents evolved over
time, compared to those provided to non-indigents. We
used Excel to create graphs and conducted a visual ana-
lysis to highlight patterns that emerged over time [38].
This complementarity information was used to triangu-
late some of the findings.
To classify the various unintended consequences, we
followed a procedure previously developed and applied
[23]. During the data analysis, we classified the different
types of consequences based on the definitions of antici-
pated/unanticipated, desirable/undesirable, and direct/
indirect presented above. To determine whether a con-
sequence was anticipated or unanticipated by program
planners, we reviewed intervention documents (e.g.
guides, midterm reports) to better understand the design
of the intervention model and its implementation. The
document review enabled us to compare the program
planners’ intended processes and outcomes to what ac-
tually emerged in real life. The titles of the documents
reviewed are available in the references [12, 13, 29, 39].
In addition, we classified consequences as desirable or
undesirable depending on whether we considered these
changes to be functional (positive) or dysfunctional
(negative) for the social system. Lastly, we classified con-
sequences as direct or indirect depending on whether
we considered these changes to be related to processes
or outcomes.
We used a cross-case synthesis to draw general con-
clusions [30]. Following a replication logic, we consid-
ered that results arising independently from more than
one facility are more powerful than those coming from a
single facility, and thus gave the former more import-
ance in the results section [30].
Results
The results showed that community-based selection of
indigents for user fee exemptions within a PBF program
led to unintended consequences. Table 3 summarizes
the results.
Table 2 Summary of data collected
Quantity
Non-participant observation
Sessions reported in field notes 241
Interviews
At facility level
Healthcare providers 15
Other support staff (drug depot manager, janitor,
security guard)
13
Volunteers & trainees 7
Community leaders (e.g., COGES, selection
committees & community health workers)
23
Service users (e.g. patients, indigents) 18
At district level
Administrative staff (e.g. manager, accountant, data
collection agent/photographer)
4
Members of contractualization and verification agency 4
Members of local association conducting community
verifications
7
At national level
Representative from the Programme d’appui au
développement en santé (PADS – program to
support health development)
1
Representative from the Service technique – financement
basé sur les résultats (ST-FBR – results-based financing –
technical service)
1
Total semi-structured interviews 93
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The subsections below describe in detail how interac-
tions between the nature and use of the intervention’s
different components (i.e., indigent selection, user fee
exemption measures, and pro-poor purchase prices), the
actors’ characteristics, and the nature of the social sys-
tem led to the emergence of a wide array of unintended
consequences.
Selection of individuals who did not meet the local
conceptualization of indigents to the detriment of others
who did
Approximately 10 and 15% of the population were se-
lected as indigents within the catchment areas of the two
facilities in PBF3. Study participants and stakeholders who
attended the annual PBF review meeting strongly affirmed
that a portion of people selected as indigents did not meet
the local conceptualization of indigents, that is, they were
not individuals with no means to support themselves and
not receiving assistance, such as widows, elders without
children, handicapped persons, or orphans. Based on their
knowledge of the communities and living conditions, some
participants claimed that many individuals who were
selected and obtained cards were not indigents. During
interviews, some of these selected ‘indigents’ openly recog-
nized that they did not truly qualify as such. These individ-
uals received a card despite having income-generating
activities, social support, ability to work, relatively high
social status, belongings, etc. Examples of indigent card
holders encountered during this study included the
mother of the president of the COGES, a security guard
and a janitor of a healthcare centre, a shop owner, a village
chief, and a member of the village development commit-
tee. The latter benefited from the indigent card to the
detriment of other unselected individuals who were
considered worst-off.
“They didn’t identify those who should have been….
Some people were selected, and others said [about
them], ‘no, that person is working and has means!’”
(Community leader_50, interview, facility 2)
“There are some indigents who do not have a card
because it is not the real indigents who were selected.”
(Healthcare worker_16, interview, facility 1).
Numerous factors contributed to the selection process
drift. First, study participants revealed that part of the se-
lection was based on personal gain, affinity, social rela-
tions, and social status. For example, numerous CHWs
and village councillors who sat on indigent selection com-
mittees obtained indigent cards for themselves or their
immediate family members (see Additional file 2).
“The treasurer [of the CSPS] is an indigent. Is that
normal? …she works and has support. The old
community health worker also has his indigent card.
They wanted to pull a scam and play politics.”
(Healthcare worker cited in field notes, facility 2).
Table 3 Classification of unintended consequences
Additional file 4 specifies how the anticipated consequences were explicitly addressed in the intervention guides
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“… this is a situation in which acquaintances and
relations were used to distribute the indigent cards.”
(Healthcare worker_23, interview, facility 1)
Some CHWs in PBF3 facilities justified obtaining indigent
cards for themselves or their family by arguing they had
been doing volunteer work for the community without suf-
ficient compensation. At the same time, some villagers and
healthcare providers accused selection committee members
of using the selection process to gain political influence for
local elections. Others believed the high relative advantage
of possessing a card played a role in the selection of individ-
uals with questionable indigent status:
“Because they’re saying everything will be free, everyone
wants to be on the list.” (Photographer for indigent
cards_39, interview, across facilities)
Another important factor contributing to the selection
of individuals not locally perceived as indigents was the
confusion and misunderstanding regarding the number
of indigents to select. After the selection of indigents
had been completed, supervisors asked the committees
to increase the numbers of indigents to reach a targeted
number per village. As such, in both PBF3 facilities, a
second selection was conducted, and people who did not
meet the local conceptualization of indigents, including
CHWs with revenues who sat on selection committees,
were added to the lists.
“We were identifying indigents and not reaching the
[targeted] number. We were tired, and we just had to
get it done…. [So] each one of us doing the selection
decided to register himself….” (CHW_15, interview,
facility 1)
“…they told us to stop because there were problems
with the numbers in the register. We had to add, then
we had to remove. At the same time, they told us to
stop, so there were problems between the supervisors....”
(Photographer for indigent cards_39, interview, across
facilities)
Moreover, the ‘photographers’—workers assigned to
take indigents’ photos for the identification cards and
record their GPS location—arrived unannounced in the
villages to conduct their work. Not having been in-
formed, some indigents had left the village with their
families—for example, to cultivate, or to attend fu-
nerals—so the photographers were not able to take their
photos. So, to reach the targeted number of indigents,
the ‘photographers’ and CHWs in the first healthcare
centre quickly replaced some of the absent indigents
with other villagers available that day.
“One day, we were all surprised to see the team with
the photographer arrive in the village to take the
pictures of the selected indigents. Because no one knew
they were coming, some of the people selected as
indigents were absent… I didn’t want to leave a void,
so I simply replaced the people who were absent with
others. When these people came back, they complained.
I told them that I replaced them because they were not
there and that it is not my fault because [the
photographer] came without informing us in advance.”
(CHW_27, interview, facility 1)
“The day of the selection, we went to his place and
didn’t see him. So, we said [in the village], we need at
least 200 people. So they had to just take whoever they
found because the decision-makers were pressuring us.”
(Healthcare worker_16, interview, facility 1)
One ‘photographer’ reported that the remuneration mo-
dality, which was based on performance, also contributed
to selecting individuals not on the initial list of indigents.
The data collection agents were reportedly paid about 320
CFA francs (0.57 USD) for each indigent identified.
“The clever ones, you’ll notice, started taking [photos
of] all of the children who were at home to facilitate
their work… It’s a strategy they made up.”
(Photographer_66, interview, across facilities)
Some selection committee members argued that the
conditions under which the selection was conducted af-
fected the quality of their work, especially due to the
complexity of the task. Some participants noted, for ex-
ample, that individuals doing the selection were not suf-
ficiently trained, that the communication system was
deficient, that not enough time was provided for the se-
lection, and that they received no financial compensa-
tion for their hard work. Participants also revealed
deficiencies within the committees involved in the selec-
tion process. For example, one CHW stated that he con-
ducted the selection of indigents alone in his village.
Meanwhile, in another centre, two members of the selec-
tion committee at the facility level revealed that they
had not seen the final list of indigents, and one was un-
aware that indigent cards had been distributed in the
catchment area during this study, claiming that “the bur-
eau didn’t do its job.” Moreover, a midterm report [12]
confirmed the committees that were initially supposed
to be in charge of validating the lists of indigents (re-
ferred to as the local validation groups) were not imple-
mented: “…this structure was never created in the
villages, given its relevance to realities on the ground.
The main observation was that the community leaders
held multiple responsibilities. Thus, the people who were
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part of the indigent selection committees were mostly the
same people who were in the local validation groups”
(p. 15). Although these obstacles relate to the implemen-
tation process, they help explain the context in which
gaming occurred for the selection of indigents.
Our observations and interviews suggested that select-
ing indigents based on personal affinity and personal
gain was consistent with the broader social system and
local stakeholders’ past experience. Study participants
reported that relationships and informal networks are
important for survival and prosperity, especially in a
context of widespread poverty. They spoke often about
the high rate of corruption within and outside the
healthcare sector. As one participant described, malfea-
sance is not uncommon in new projects implemented by
international organizations with limited funding and
timeframes.
“I see projects that come to the village, and the chief is
asked to bring forward the indigents. Everyone gathers
up their own family, even if they’re able to cover their
own care.” (Patient_10, interview, facility 1)
“The country is corrupt! Here, everything depends on
relationships.” (Student midwife cited in field notes,
across cases)
Ossification
According to a midterm report [12], consideration
was given to setting up a system to update indigent
lists after the initial selection: “This approach makes
it possible to regularly update the list of indigent per-
sons selected” (p. 7). However, no update mechanism
had been implemented at the time of this study.
Thus, indigents who were absent when the photog-
rapher came to their village or people who fell into
poverty after the selection were unable to obtain an
indigent card. After the photos were taken, selection
committees were unable to modify indigent lists.
Many study participants did not know how long indi-
gent cards were valid, and some believed changes
would not be possible for the next 3 years. Indigent
cards with identification errors could not be cor-
rected, as they were manufactured in Vietnam. The
selection process had a low level of adaptability, that
is, stakeholders did not formally have the opportunity
to make modifications according to their needs and
constraints over time. Thus, the intervention led to a
certain level of ossification, that is, organizational par-
alysis brought about by a rigid system and the pres-
ence of a centralized decision-making structure, as
illustrated by the following citations:
“Because they [decision-makers] say we can only
review this in three years, we’ll go along with it to see
what happens over the next three years and how
they’ll select the indigents next time.... We’ll bear
with it and keep advocating to see whether they can
shorten that three-year period.” (Healthcare worker_17,
interview, facility 1)
“If PBF [officials] don’t come back, how can we get
that card for him? It’s a problem.” (COGES_60,
interview, facility 2)
“We don’t know how we’ll get through this.” (Head nurse
cited in field notes, facility 1)
Dissatisfaction regarding selection of indigents
In both facilities, study participants reported that the
selection process led to frustrations, conflicts between
actors, and a sense of injustice. Indigents omitted
from the selection or absent when the photographer
came demanded that the situation be rectified. Some
individuals demanded to be selected as indigents due
to the relative advantage of having free healthcare
services, the perceived inequity of the selection
process, and the lack of understanding regarding the
definition of ‘indigents’. “Why hasn’t anyone from my
household been selected? Not a single person!? How is
it that some benefit and others don’t?” asked one
member of the committee in charge of coordinating
the selection at the facility level during a heated
COGES meeting (facility 2). To appease these types
of frustrations, selection committee members some-
times made false promises to the population, made
apologies and distanced themselves from the selection
process, arguing that it was the ‘community’ that
chose the indigents.
“…if I’d known, I wouldn’t even have gotten involved in
this work. It caused us a lot of problems. In fact, every
morning people would come to my house to ask whether
a new list had opened up so they could register. This
bothered me a lot. Also, it made me uncomfortable
when some people scowled and got angry.” (CHW_14,
interview, facility 1)
“People are envious. Some people want to really force
their way into getting a spot, but it’s not for them.”
(COGES_59, interview, facility 2)
Despite these complaints, community members gener-
ally remained in favour of user fee exemptions for
indigents.
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“In any case, the villagers said it’s a good project for
the whole village.” (CHW_27, interview, facility 1)
“The people actually appreciated the idea of covering
indigents. They even said that, if it were to really
happen…then everyone will start to believe in ‘the white
man’s paper’.” (Volunteer IHW_11, interview, facility 1)
Increased awareness regarding health equity within the
community
The intervention triggered discussions and reflections
within the community on health equity and the issue of
indigence. For example, community members not se-
lected as indigents engaged in discussions with health-
care workers and selection committee members to
better understand the selection process and the reasons
for their exclusion. This provided opportunities to ex-
plain the concept of indigence and the importance of
providing access to services to the most vulnerable
individuals.
“In the community, some have welcomed it. Then there
are others who say, no, if that’s how it is, then everyone
is an indigent, even though they’re not indigents. So we
explain often… it’s just to help the poorest…. Some
understand, but others don’t.” (Healthcare staff_17,
interview, facility 1)
“Some said, the entire village is made up of indigents,
so we should select everyone. We said, no, it’s not like
that. We explained to those people that there are
selection criteria. We have to select the old widows who
have no support, people with no support. Those are the
people we chose.” (CHW_27, interview, facility 1)
Withholding of indigent cards
A major concern for study participants in the second fa-
cility was that some indigent cards were missing and
never distributed to their owners. Healthcare workers
and CHWs put the blame for these missing cards on the
‘photographers’ and technical difficulties with the equip-
ment used to identify and photograph indigents (i.e.,
digital tablets). However, observation revealed that a
head nurse—who did not approve of the selection of cer-
tain indigents and was concerned this process would
negatively influence the medications stock—had surrep-
titiously removed some indigent cards before their distri-
bution in the community. A district supervisor reported
that this strategy had been used in other healthcare
centres and recommended this approach to healthcare
workers in the first facility to lower the number of
indigents and limit the healthcare centres’ financial diffi-
culties (as discussed in the next subsection).
“Some head nurses filtered the cards, and when people
ask for them, say they haven’t arrived. They say that
every time. You just had to do the same thing.”
(Supervisor cited in field notes, facility 1)
Financial difficulties and drug shortages
Healthcare centres in PBF3 received higher unit pur-
chase prices for some targeted services provided to
indigents (see Additional file 1). For example, in the
first facility, a consultation for an indigent adult was
purchased at 1020 F CFA (1.72 USD), and for a
non-indigent adult, 140 F CFA (0.24 USD). In ex-
change for these subsidies, healthcare centres were re-
quired to provide free services and free medications
to indigents. If the cost of the medication prescribed
was higher than the lump sum provided through the
unit purchase price, the COGES had to absorb the
difference using their other sources of revenues (user
fees and sales of medication to non-indigent patients).
If the cost was lower, the COGES retained the profit.
“A district supervisor said, ‘It’s not just the white man’s
money. The COGES also has to contribute to the
indigents’ medications.’ In response, the healthcare
workers shook their heads in disapproval.” (Field
notes, facility 1)
Numerous participants, including healthcare workers
and COGES members, argued that delays in PBF pay-
ments caused financial difficulties for healthcare centres
and led to drug shortages. At the time of the study, these
delays were more than 6 months for quantity-related
payments and more than 1 year for quality-related pay-
ments. Participants complained that, without the reve-
nues from medications provided to indigents, it was
difficult to replenish the centres’ drug depots. Some
participants feared this would lower the quality of
care for patients, who would have to obtain their
medications elsewhere.
“We have to wait for PBF to come pay for the products
the indigents used before placing another order. I find
it a bit difficult.” (Healthcare worker_51, interview,
facility 2)
There was also consensus among healthcare workers
and COGES members in the first healthcare centre that
the unit purchase prices for services to indigent patients
were insufficient to cover the cost of their medications
and that the healthcare centres did not have enough
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slack in resources to ensure proper functioning of the
user fee exemption for indigents. Participants believed
the insufficiency of compensation was causing financial
difficulties and could lead to drug shortages in the
healthcare centre.
“If we stubbornly continue to treat people with
prescriptions costing up to 3,000 francs and the system
only pays 800 francs, who loses in that case? It’s the
COGES that will suffer, and over time, we risk not
even having products here at the depot…. Ultimately
the healthcare facility could be at risk for closure.
People will prefer to consult where they can find the
products.” (Healthcare worker_11, interview, facility 1)
According to the intervention guide [13], the purchase
prices were intended to “encourage healthcare workers”
to provide services to the poor. In practice, however, the
financial incentive was perceived as insufficient to trig-
ger proactive strategies on their part. For many health-
care workers in the first facility (PBF3), the relative
advantage of providing user fee exemptions to indigents
was mitigated by the fact that the healthcare centre lost
money when the value of the medication provided for
free was higher than the unit purchase price. Conse-
quently, no additional efforts or innovative strategies
were deployed to provide more services to indigents spe-
cifically, as explained by this healthcare worker:
“We didn’t think of doing that. When an indigent person
comes in, we treat him, and that’s all…. We know that
with this [intervention], sometimes we make money, and
sometimes we lose.” (Healthcare worker_17, interview,
facility 1)
Healthcare workers from facilities without equity mea-
sures for indigents (PBF1) also expressed lack of support
for intervention models that provide user fee exemptions
for indigents, for fear that those caused financial
difficulties.
Multiple strategies adopted to limit services to indigents
Qualitative data showed that, shortly after the distribu-
tion of indigent cards, healthcare workers in the first
facility (PBF3) adopted a series of strategic measures to
limit the services and medications provided for free to
individuals with indigent cards (as described in the sub-
sections below). Secondary data on the quantity of ser-
vices provided to indigent patients before and after
indigent cards were distributed were consistent with
these findings. Figures 2 and 3 show that, in both facil-
ities with indigent targeting, the number of new consul-
tations for patients classified as indigents increased
considerably after indigent cards became available in
November 2015. However, the following months saw
rapid declines in the number of new consultations for
patients classified as indigents. Since these declines are
unlikely to have been due to sudden changes in morbid-
ity prevalence or to the rapid cure of all indigents, these
data support the findings that healthcare workers limited
free services delivered to indigents. This is relatively
consistent with the evolution of care in other healthcare
centres belonging to the same intervention arm (PBF3)
within the study district (Fig. 4), supporting the transfer-
ability of findings.
Moreover, the number of new consultations for pa-
tients classified as indigents did not follow seasonal pat-
terns. Rainfalls generally influence the spread of diseases
such as malaria, causing an increase in use of care be-
tween June and August. As expected from seasonal pat-
terns, the number of new consultations for adult
patients not classified as indigents peaked in July 2016.
However, the number of new consultations for adult pa-
tients classified as indigents during this period actually
followed the opposite pattern and gradually decreased or
remained null. There is no reason to believe indigent
adults would not be similarly affected by seasonal pat-
terns. These secondary data also support the finding
suggesting healthcare workers limited the delivery of free
services to indigents. Within the study district (Fig. 4)
and across intervention districts (Additional file 3), we
also observed that the average number of new consulta-
tions for adult patients classified as indigents did not fol-
low seasonal patterns.
The decline in new consultations for patients classified
as indigents was more gradual for facility 2 than facility
1. This observation is consistent with the findings. In
comparing the two facilities, we found that healthcare
workers in facility 2 displayed a weaker understanding of
PBF payment modalities for services and medications
provided to indigents. They erroneously believed the
PBF intervention would reimburse the entire cost of
medications provided to indigents in addition to paying
a unit purchase price for each consultation. Thus, at the
time of the qualitative data collection, we found that,
even though some indigent cards had been retained and
there were delays in distributing cards (as shown in
Fig. 3), healthcare workers in facility 2 delivered health-
care services to indigents. They expressed less disapproval
of the indigent component of the intervention compared
to workers in facility 1, whose disapproval was relatively
high. Over time, however, the patterns in the number of
new consultations for patients classified as indigents grad-
ually moved in the same direction in both facilities.
It should be noted, however, that the peak in new
consultations for non-indigent children coincided with
the implementation of a new national policy for free
healthcare to children under five in June 2016. At that
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time, the PBF intervention stopped purchasing services
delivered to indigent children because children’s medica-
tions became covered by the national policy.
Capping the value of medication prescribed
To limit financial difficulties and protect the drug depot,
healthcare workers and COGES members in facility 1
limited the prescribing of medications for indigents.
They tried to keep the costs of those prescriptions under
the PBF’s lump sum purchase prices. Interviews and
examination of the indigent registry confirmed that pre-
scriptions for indigents tended to cost around 1000 F
CFA. Some supervisors and healthcare workers were con-
cerned this practice was not rational and could have
Fig. 2 Facility 1 - Total number of new consultations for patients classified as indigents or non-indigents seen in curative care.
Note: As shown by the qualitative data, the curves representing non-indigents are likely to include individuals who should have received user fee
exemptions but were requested to pay, either because they did not possess an indigent card or because healthcare workers refused to recognize
their indigent status. Similarly, the curves representing indigents may include individuals who received indigent cards even though they did not
truly meet the local conceptualization of indigents
Fig. 3 Facility 2 - Total number of new consultations for patients classified as indigents or non-indigents seen in curative care
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negative consequences on treatment effectiveness, health-
care system efficiency, and patients’ health.
“If someone [indigent] comes in with simple malaria, we’ve
been told we’re not supposed to exceed 850 F CFA for a
prescription. ACTs for adults are 300 francs, the consultation
is 200 francs, two paracetamol tablets are at least 150
francs. That’s 650 francs. At 850 francs, they say the
healthcare centre makes a profit, but you’ve used gloves to
examine the patient! Who covers the price of the gloves?
What does the healthcare centre gain? Nothing! And, for
example, if someone comes in with malaria plus
pneumonia, whether you like it or not, the prescription costs
more because you have to give an antibiotic, Amoxine, at
least three tablets, plus Carbotoux [cough syrup], which goes
for around 650 francs. Already that doubles or even triples
their 850 francs. And if you don’t do that, the sick person
will come back!… So they have to either increase the
coverage or suspend their indigent business…. Now that
they’ve imposed this on us, we’re obliged to do what they
want.” (Healthcare worker_16, interview, facility 1)
Failure to follow the percentage cap on indigents covered
monthly
According to the intervention guidelines [13], free consulta-
tions for indigents should not constitute more than 10% of
the total quantity of consultations to “avoid the moral
hazard” (p. 53). Both the qualitative and quantitative data
(see Figs. 2 and 3) showed this policy was not being system-
atically applied in either of the healthcare centres with user
free exemptions. In facility 1, for example, 19% of curative
consultations in December 2015 were provided to indi-
gents. This proportion fell to under 1% in January 2016,
when measures were taken to limit free consultations to in-
digents. Although healthcare workers in both centres knew
about the percentage cap, there was misunderstanding re-
garding the correct percentage of patients that could be
treated for free as indigents each month. Some participants
also disagreed with applying a percentage cap.
“At one point they [supervisors] had given us a monthly
target rate. We exceeded it, and the indigents kept
coming. We tried telling them we had to stop [for the
month] and start again later, but they [indigents] didn’t
accept that! They said I didn’t want to give the products
for free.” (Drug depot manager_22, interview, facility 1)
“…if you reach the 40th person, will you tell the others
not to come?! Ah, no!” (Healthcare worker_16,
interview, facility 1)
Triage of indigents during consultations
Fearing financial difficulties due to the user fee exemp-
tion, the COGES of facility 1 requested that healthcare
Fig. 4 Average number of new consultations for patients classified as indigents or non-indigents seen in curative care in PBF3 facilities (n = 7)
within the study district.
Note: Healthcare centres (n = 7) for which the intervention arm was not specified in the database were excluded. PBF ceased to fund services
delivered to indigent children under five once the free healthcare policy began in June 2016 because it covered their user fees and medications
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workers triage patients during consultations, then
provide free services only to those they believed were
‘true’ indigents and require ‘false’ indigents to pay.
The healthcare workers’ triage was based on their
knowledge and perceptions of patients’ current socio-eco-
nomic situation. COGES members and healthcare workers
were confident they could accurately identify genuine
indigents.
“…we told them we would stop the system and verify
for ourselves who the true indigents are. Currently,
when an elderly person comes in and we see he doesn’t
even have enough to pay for products, we qualify him
as indigent. A blind person is an indigent, as is
someone who lost their children and is alone without
support. We take these people as indigents, and we
make sure the prescription doesn’t exceed 800 francs.”
(Healthcare worker_11, interview, facility 1)
“When healthcare workers take the cards from indigents,
they ask them certain questions…. like, does he have
anyone who can give him a hand and help him with his
expenses? Questions like that.” (COGES_14, interview,
facility 1)
In contrast, a participant from facility 2 explained that
they did not conduct any triage during the consultation
because that would cause too much conflict with the
local population, who traditionally are known to be
warriors: “the healthcare worker wouldn’t be able to
work here anymore!” This helps explain the more
gradual decrease in the quantity of curative care to
indigents in Fig. 3.
Uncertain and unequal coverage for indigents
Both observation and interviews suggested that the
selected indigents in facility 1 did not know in ad-
vance whether their healthcare would be free of
charge. Upon consultation, some indigents had to
decide whether to pay for the services they needed
or leave without treatment. A number of factors in-
fluenced indigents’ access to free services, such as
the healthcare workers’ triage of ‘true’ and ‘false’ in-
digents, the monthly percentage cap on indigents,
the cap on the value of medications prescribed, sud-
den interruptions of the user fee exemption due to
financial difficulties, indigents’ reactions to these
measures, etc.
“The first time, it was free, the second time it was free
again, but the third time they told me to pay…. Ah,
really, it discouraged me... If I don’t have money, I
won’t come back [to the CSPS]. Now I know it’s not
free.” (Indigent patient_20, interview, facility 1)
“There was an indigent man one time who went to the
healthcare centre, and even though he was an indigent
with a card, he paid a certain sum of money.”
(CHW_26, interview, facility 1)
Fixation on PBF quality indicators
To promote orderliness, PBF evaluators deducted per-
formance points if information in the registers was erased
or crossed out. In both facilities with user fee exemptions
for indigents, the staffs’ fixation on such performance indi-
cators occasionally prevented indigents from receiving
free care. For example, indigents who were accidentally
listed in the wrong register were required to pay for ser-
vices, as mistakes could not be erased or scratched out
without risking losing PBF points.
“It often happens that people have nicknames. If
someone gives a name that isn’t on the indigent card,
we’ll tell him he has to come back another day, because
PBF doesn’t like it when we cross things out or erase
things.” (Drug depot manager_22, interview, facility 1)
“When I arrived, I didn’t present the [indigent] card
right away and they recorded my information in
the register. After I showed them the card, they said
I still had to pay for the medication, and I paid.”
(Indigent_18, interview, facility 1)
Conflicts between indigents and health system actors
regarding user fee exemptions
In facility 1, indigents expressed great dissatisfaction and
lack of trust regarding healthcare workers and selection
committee members because of the strategies used to
limit their access to free healthcare and medications; in-
digents accused them of cheating and scamming. This
experience was discouraging for some indigents.
“They don’t understand why they were promised free
healthcare services through these indigent cards and
then later told they had to pay for these services. So
they said it’s the healthcare workers who are playing
politics on them…. many people came here to
complain, saying that I had told them that with the
card they would have full and free healthcare services
and that the products prescribed to them would also be
free, and yet that’s not the case at all.” (COGES_14,
interview, facility 1)
Sense of empowerment for indigents to access healthcare
Many participants in both facilities argued that the user
fee exemptions initially increased the selected indigents’
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sense of empowerment to access healthcare services. It
facilitated their decisions and actions to seek healthcare
services more quickly. This finding was consistent with
healthcare workers’ reports and the quantitative data in-
dicating that the user fee exemption policy triggered a
steep rise in attendance at health centres, at least until
the services were curtailed.
“It’s better because the [decision to seek] healthcare is
in the hands of the indigent person. Under the
previous system, the indigent was objectified. The
person’s relatives decided everything.” (COGES_59,
interview, facility 2)
“Their morale improved and they became brave…. All
the old sick people who had been hiding came out.”
(COGES_21, interview, facility 1)
However, this initial sense of empowerment did not al-
ways translate into greater access to free healthcare
services over time, due to the curtailing of services de-
scribed above.
Discussion
As postulated by the diffusion of innovations theory, we
found that the nature and use of the intervention inter-
acted with the social system and the characteristics of
the different actors to trigger unintended consequences.
One of the main findings was that different types of ac-
tors deliberately re-invented elements of the intervention
over which they had control to strategically increase its
relative advantage and cope with implementation chal-
lenges, thereby triggering unintended consequences.
More specifically, many selection committee members
partly re-invented the selection process to benefit
personally from access to free healthcare services. In
contrast, for many healthcare workers and COGES
members, the relative advantage of providing free
healthcare services and medications to indigents was in-
sufficient due to the perceived low unit purchase prices
for services to indigents (as conceived in the initial inter-
vention model), the late payments (the implementation
of the innovation), and the healthcare centre’s financial
constraints (the nature of the local context). Healthcare
workers deliberately modified the intervention model in
different ways to make it more compatible with local re-
sources and their own needs by retaining indigent cards,
capping the value of medications provided, triaging
patients into ‘true’ and ‘false’ indigent categories, etc.
Although such re-invention was perceived as desirable
by some local actors, it can also threaten the theoretical
basis and equity implications of the intervention de-
pending on the nature of the modifications to essential
components [40].
Application of the theory
Rogers suggests that one way to better understand the
consequences of innovations is to classify them in a tax-
onomy [19]. Program evaluators and researchers tend to
focus on certain types of consequences (e.g. desirable
and anticipated) while neglecting others (e.g. undesirable
and unanticipated) [41]. Thus, conceiving an inclusive
typology ex ante compels stakeholders to consider the
possibility that interventions can produce consequences
that are not intended. In this study, we found Roger’s
classification useful for conceptualizing different types of
consequences, broadening our focus beyond intended
consequences during data collection, and organizing the
presentation of results.
One challenge we encountered, however, was in deter-
mining whether consequences were anticipated or un-
anticipated, since this could vary depending on the
perspectives of the different types of stakeholders (e.g.
researchers, policy makers, healthcare workers). As de-
scribed in the theoretical framework, we classified conse-
quences as anticipated if they were addressed in the
intervention’s implementation guides (see Additional file 4).
However, guides were sometimes unclear and imprecise
regarding anticipated consequences outside the targeted
objectives. Change agents hired to develop intervention
guidelines do not always have a comprehensive under-
standing of the scientific knowledge and do not always
openly disclose undesirable consequence that could
undermine intervention models. Thus, while the concept
of ‘anticipation’ was useful to guide our focus during data
collection, its application was more problematic for a
clear-cut classification of consequences.
Targeting and user fee exemption policies
Our findings are consistent with past research suggest-
ing that user fee exemption policies can lead to unin-
tended consequences. With regard to indigent selection,
for example, a study in Madagascar reported that village
workers’ own interests influenced the selection and that
individuals who were not selected complained [42]. Mul-
tiple studies have also found that user fee exemption
policies can lead to reimbursement delays, revenue
losses for health centres, or the unavailability of drugs
[16, 43–46]. In line with our findings, studies in Mali,
Senegal, and Madagascar found that healthcare workers
adopted various strategies to reduce the scope of free
care for targeted groups due to implementation dysfunc-
tions, sometimes leading to complaints from the tar-
geted population [42, 44, 46]. One study on targeting the
poorest in a PBF program in Cameroon also found nega-
tive reactions among community members, such as jeal-
ousy [5]. The finding that user fee exemptions increase
indigents’ sense of empowerment has also previously
been documented [47].
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Unlike in other studies, however, healthcare workers
in Burkina Faso did not explicitly report feeling
exploited or overworked with regard to providing ser-
vices to indigents, although they did report an in-
crease in the use of services [16]. This difference may
be due to the limited number of indigents covered by
the user fee exemption policy, the healthcare centres’
available capacity, the staff ’s strategies to limit free
services, and the timing of the data collection, as the
use of services varies over the year.
Combining PBF with equity measures
Innovation clusters, such as combining PBF with user
fee exemption measures for indigents, may be useful to
respond to the growing concern that PBF inadequately
addresses inequity in access to care [7]. We found,
however, that packaging PBF with user fee exemption
measures for indigents can lead to unintended conse-
quences. First, the healthcare workers’ fixation on PBF
quality indicators sometimes hindered access to free
healthcare services for indigents. Second, the low pur-
chase prices for services were perceived as insufficient to
motivate providers to target indigents and to cover the
costs of the medication. A similar result was found in
Cameroon, where some healthcare workers complained
that the costs of treating indigents within a PBF program
often surpassed the amount received [5].
However, we do not have quantitative data to confirm
or challenge the participants’ claims that services to indi-
gents were in fact costing more than the unit purchase
price. Caution is advised when interpreting this result, as
healthcare workers may have ulterior motives. Past stud-
ies have reported that user fee exemption policies may
result in a loss of income for healthcare workers [16].
Thus, in the present study, it is unclear whether such
practices might have influenced the healthcare workers’
negative discourse regarding the purchase prices for ser-
vices to indigents. Those prices were supposed to be
higher than simple cost recovery, to motivate healthcare
workers to actively seek out the very poor, but as these
services were not costed before the intervention was im-
plemented, prices were set arbitrarily. The healthcare
workers’ views and beliefs regarding the intervention
were important because they translated into concrete ac-
tions that affected the quality and adequacy of services
delivered to indigents. This highlights the pivotal role of
“street-level bureaucrats”, who have a wide scope of dis-
cretion when implementing policies [48, 49]. As was
found in this study, capping the value of medications
given to indigents can lead to ineffective treatments and
exacerbation of diseases, although a proper audit would
be useful to evaluate the threat to quality of care.
Program planners need to calculate adequately the real
costs of treating indigents with medications to ensure
they are not putting healthcare workers in a conflict of
interests, where they have to choose between providing
needed medications to indigents and protecting their
own or the healthcare centre’s financial interests [42].
The importance of adequately calculating fixed purchase
prices for user fee exemption policies in Burkina Faso
has been highlighted in the past [50].
Policy implications
The results of this study have policy implications, as
governments in LMICs and funders search for strategies
to promote the human right to health and to achieve
universal health coverage [51]. Global health authorities
have affirmed that it would be an unacceptable trade-off
to “first include in the universal coverage scheme only
those with the ability to pay and not include informal
workers and the poor, even if such an approach would be
easier” [52]. Thus, even if PBF funding ceases, global
health actors must consider intervention models that
can reach those most in need. In Burkina Faso, for ex-
ample, a law on universal health insurance (n° 060–
2015/CNT) stipulates that the state is the debtor for the
indigents’ subscriptions (article 48) [53]. In this context,
this study’s results may help decision-makers appreciate
the implementation challenges and unintended conse-
quences that can emerge from a community-based selec-
tion of indigents. The results are also pertinent with
respect to the implementation of the country’s national
health financing strategy for universal health coverage
(2016–2013), which established strategic purchasing as
one of its pillars [54].
Combining user fee exemption policies with PBF is
likely to continue to be met with criticism and resistance
from local healthcare workers if program planners do
not resolve implementation challenges such as lack of
starting funds, long reimbursement delays, or insuffi-
cient incentives. Past experiences suggest that, for a fi-
nancing policy to be implemented successfully, budgets
must be realistic and lost revenues need to be replaced
in a timely manner to ensure a smooth flow of resources
[55]. As McPake et al. [56] argue, quick action without
sufficient preparation could lead to a deterioration in
service quality. The practical issues of UHC implementa-
tion need more attention and research [1].
Limitations of the study
Despite our rigorous design, this study does present po-
tential limitations. First, some participants may have
tried to portray the intervention positively, either to at-
tract more international aid or due to fears of loss of
confidentiality. However, this would have led to an
underestimation of undesirable consequences rather
than an overestimation. The high number of participants
and the researcher’s immersion in the milieu reduced
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the risk of such potential biases. Second, while long ob-
servation periods within a few healthcare centres in-
creased the credibility of results, they may have limited
the degree to which findings may be generalized to other
contexts or settings. It is possible that the implementa-
tion process differed between districts and intervention
modalities, challenging transferability of results. How-
ever, we triangulated the results from our study facilities
with multiple sources of qualitative and quantitative data
based on broader samples (e.g. routine data, discussions
during a one-week national PBF meeting, intervention
documents). Moreover, we worked with local manage-
ment teams to carefully select healthcare centres that
were considered representative of the normal context. A
third limitation is that we did not conduct observations
during the training of local actors and the indigent selec-
tion process. This may have introduced potential biases
in data collection (e.g. memory bias) and may have re-
sulted in our capturing only a portion of the unintended
consequences. Finally, we found that dealing with lan-
guage differences was a challenge. In interviews, some
participants spoke in their second language (French),
while others spoke in their native language and relied on
an interpreter. While this may have limited some partici-
pants’ ability to express themselves, we do not believe it
affected the validity of results, given the large number of
participants and the triangulation of data.
Directions for future research
This study suggests numerous paths for future research.
It would be interesting to use quantitative methods to
conduct complementary statistical analyses. This could
enable us, for example, to: 1) compare the value of med-
ications prescribed to indigent vs. non-indigent patients;
2) assess the number of false inclusions and exclusions
on indigent rolls; and 3) assess the cost-effectiveness of
pro-poor targeting in comparison to other health equity
measures. It would also be interesting to examine how
the leadership and management of the intervention at
the national and district levels influenced the implemen-
tation challenges that emerged. Studies have found that
management and leadership practices, including per-
sonal initiatives of district leaders, effective supervision,
and commitment of the district health management
team and local government officials, are critical for suc-
cessful implementation of exemption policies and UHC
reforms [1, 57, 58].
Conclusions
In the pursuit of universal health coverage, international
organizations and governments of LMICs are increas-
ingly considering strategies to combine PBF with health
equity measures. Using the diffusion of innovations the-
ory, we found that implementing PBF combined with
user fee exemptions for indigents led to considerable
unintended consequences in Burkina Faso. These unin-
tended consequences can significantly undermine the
overall effectiveness and equity of the intervention. To
promote successful implementation, program planners
need to ensure that local actors, such as healthcare
workers, truly adhere to user fee exemption policies.
This requires calculating the real costs of treating indi-
gents with medications so that purchase prices paid to
healthcare centres are adequate. Moreover, when com-
bining PBF with equity measures, program planners
should ensure that healthcare workers’ fixation on per-
formance indicators does not undermine free services to
indigents. Future research and evaluation of promising
health interventions should focus well beyond intended
consequences to consider unintended changes that may
be less discernible but equally important.
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